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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROY LEE GLASPER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, Case No. 20000481 -CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 3 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief challenging his convictions for burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(f) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Should petitioner's claims be dismissed because they are inadequately 
briefed? 
Standard of Review: "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded 
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.' Utah R. App. P. 24(j)." State v. 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, fl 8,1 P.3d 1108. 
Issue II: Did the district court properly deny and dismiss the petition for post-
conviction relief? 
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies: 
Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we 
review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb 
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, '"we survey 
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and 
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the 
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'" 
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this 
appeal: 
Addendum A - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C 
Addendum B - Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-
35a-101 through § 78-35a-110 (1996) 
Addendum C - Burglary - Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and Theft -
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was charged with burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 487-88). After initially requesting a jury 
trial, petitioner chose to try his case to the bench (R.342). Following a bench trial on 
April 2,1997, petitioner was convicted of both counts (R. 339). After several delays, 
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petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive zero-to-five year sentences on July 7, 
1997 (R. 336-37). 
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. This Court affirmed in a 
memorandum decision dated September 11,1998 (R. 317-19) (Addendum D). 
In June 1999, petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief (entitled an 
application for writ of habeas corpus) in district court (R. 1-200). In a Memorandum 
Decision dated June 30, 1999, the court summarily dismissed petitioner's claims 
relating to discretion of the trial judge, imposition of consecutive sentences, and 
insufficiency of the evidence, because these issues were (or should have been) 
raised on direct appeal (R. 205-210) (Addendum E). The court directed that a copy 
of the petition be served on the Utah Attorney General, with respect to petitioner's 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 
The original petition named A. C. Newland, the warden of a prison in 
California, as the respondent. Petitioner was incarcerated in California through the 
Interstate Compact. However, petitioner remains under the Utah Department of 
Corrections, and his release date will be determined by the Utah Board of Pardons. 
Since the Utah Attorney General is not counsel for and does not represent Warden 
Newland of the California State prison, the office of the Utah Attorney General filed 
a motion to dismiss the petition without prejudice, to allow petitioner to file an 
3 
amended or corrected petition naming the State of Utah as the respondent (R. 211-
215).1 
In July 1999, petitioner filed an amended petition (R. 219-228). However, in 
addition to changing the respondent to the State of Utah, the amended petition 
included new and additional claims. The district court summarily dismissed 
petitioner's new claims which related to the scheduling of the trial and allegations 
that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence on direct appeal (R. 242-246) 
(Addendum F). The Court then directed the Attorney General to respond to those 
points designated as arguments 3, 4, 6, and 7 within the petitioner's amended 
petition. Those claims alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to secure 
defense witnesses, for failing to use defense funds to place an add in local papers 
to ascertain defense witnesses, for failing to introduce crime scene photographs, for 
stipulating to the intent to commit theft, and for failing to file a reply brief on appeal 
(R. 242-246). 
The State filed a written response to the claims specified by the court (R. 
513). On January 20, 2000, after receiving the State's written response, the court 
entered a memorandum decision which held that "even if the facts are as 
represented by the petitioner, he has failed to show any basis upon which the court 
could find his counsel ineffective for failing to pursue the unidentified couple. That 
1
 Rule 65C(h), Utah R. Civ. P. provides that "[i]f the petition is a challenge 
to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah repre-
sented by the Attorney General." 
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claim is hereby dismissed summarily." (R. 555) (Addendum G). The Court also 
dismissed petitioner's allegation that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel when his counsel told the Court of Appeals there was no dispute that the 
petitioner intended to commit a theft (R. 553-54). 
On May 9, 2000, the court held an evidentiary hearing on whether petitioner 
received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to interview or call Detective 
Orton as a witness, and for failing to introduce photographs at trial (R. 553-57, 594-
95). 
On May 11, 2000, the district court entered a final written memorandum 
decision which denied and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief (R. 596-
605) (Addendum H). Petitioner timely appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early evening of January 24, 1997, petitioner and his companion, 
Shanta Venson, drove into Cedar City in a red Jaguar sports car (R. 431, 375). 
They stopped at Maurice's, a clothing store, where Venson purchased several items 
using a credit card (R. 374, 364). A short time later the two pulled into the parking 
lot of a Deseret Industries Thrift Store ["Dl"] (R. 373). Although the Dl had just 
closed, the front doors to the main floor of the store remained unlocked so that 
employees could bring in sales merchandise from the front sidewalk (R. 435-36). 
Following standard procedure, employees had placed a "CLOSED" sign on the front 
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door and turned off the bank of lights closest to the front of the store (R. 435, 411, 
407, 389). 
Petitioner and Venson entered the store separately (R. 372). Venson 
remained near the front of the store to choose a belt while petitioner moved to the 
back of the store among the clothing racks (R. 418, 416, 398). Another couple 
entered the store soon after (R. 418). There were no Dl employees on the sales 
floor at this time (R. 419, 363). 
Store manager Dennis Goldsworthy was putting away the day's receipts and 
preparing the daily deposit in his private office at the back of the store (R. 435,423). 
Hearing unfamiliar voices at the front of the store, he left his office to investigate (R. 
434-35). He left a bank deposit bag containing $794.00 in cash and $329.96 in 
checks sitting on his desk in his office (R. 427-29). When he reached the front of the 
store he informed Venson and the other couple that the store was closed (R. 434). 
The second couple left immediately, but Venson became "somewhat animated" and 
repeatedly insisted on purchasing a fifty-cent belt (R. 433-34). Goldsworthy, who 
was unaware that petitioner was also in the store, agreed to sell her the belt but only 
if she had exact change (R. 434,420). He explained that all of the money had been 
removed from the cash registers (R. 434). 
As Goldsworthy performed the transaction, Dl employee Joy Stover came up 
the stairs to the main floor (R. 399). Stover observed petitioner near the manager's 
office and saw him "walk over behind the clothes fixture and kind of slink down and 
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walk towards the front of the store" (R. 398, 392). As petitioner wove his way 
towards the front door, she noticed the bank bag in his hand and watched him "put 
the bag under his shirt" (R. 396-97). Petitioner and Venson exited the store together 
(R. 431). 
When Stover told Goldsworthy what she had seen, Goldsworthy immediately 
rushed to the office and discovered that the bank bag was missing (R. 431-33,395). 
Store employees raced to the parking lot and approached the closest vehicle, which 
was occupied by the couple that had entered the store after petitioner (R. 402, 382-
83). By the time the employees determined that petitioner and Venson were not in 
the car, petitioner's red Jaguar was leaving the parking lot (R. 431). The employees 
then notified police about the incident and described petitioner's vehicle (R. 382). 
A report of the incident with the vehicle description went out on the police 
radio (R. 460-61). Officer Preston Griffiths was patrolling 1-15 northbound near 
Parowan when he heard the report (R. 458). Shortly thereafter, he saw a car 
matching the report's description speed past him (R. 457). Officer Griffiths 
eventually caught up with the car and pulled it over after it exited 1-15 (R. 456a).2 
When petitioner got out of the Jaguar and came toward the police car, Officer 
Griffiths drew his weapon, ordered petitioner onto the ground and handcuffed him 
(R. 456-456a). A subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered the bank bag, torn up 
2
 This page is not numbered. Since it lies between the pages designated 
as 456 and 457, the State refers to it as 456a. (The page is stamped with 
number 158, which was its designation in the previous direct appeal). 
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checks made out to Deseret Industries, and a deposit slip (R. 438-40). The missing 
cash, amounting to $794.00, was found in Venson's left sock (R. 451). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately 
briefed. Petitioner does not appropriately challenge the decisions of the district 
court, but merely attempts to raise the same arguments which he raised in his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, 
petitioner merely asserts facts and opinions that he believes support his claims and 
concludes that he is entitled to relief. This does not conform to the requirements of 
the briefing rule. 
Even if petitioner's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the 
district court should be affirmed because the petition for post-conviction relief was 
properly denied and dismissed. The district court acted appropriately when it 
summarily dismissed some of petitioner's claims. The court also ruled correctly 
when it held that petitioner had not established any ineffectiveness of trial or 
appellate counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY ARE 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED. 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
However, in his appellate brief, petitioner simply raises the same arguments he 
8 
raised in his post-conviction petition.3 Petitioner does not challenge the decisions 
of the district court. He has not argued or established that any of the court's findings 
were clearly erroneous, or that its conclusions of law were incorrect. Rather than 
provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner merely asserts facts and opinions that 
he believes support his claims, and then concludes that he is entitled to relief. This 
does not conform to the requirements of the briefing rule. 
Inadequate Briefing. Rule 24 (a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
requires an appellant to include his "contentions and reasons... with respect to the 
issues presented," including "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on." This Court does not address issues inadequately briefed under 
this rule.4 See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, fl 6,1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider 
argument which is inadequately briefed); MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 
(Utah 1998). 
3
 Petitioner also attempts to raise some new issues which were never 
raised in his petition. If a claim was not raised in the petition, and was therefore 
not addressed by the district court, it will not be addressed for the first time on 
appeal. See Pascual v. Carver, 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). The issues 
concerning petitioner's waiver of a jury trial and the failure of his counsel to move 
to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor were not raised in the post-conviction 
petition. They therefore may not be addressed now. 
4
 The State acknowledges that pro se briefs must be construed liberally. 
SeeMollv. Carter, 179 F.R.D. 609, 610 (1998); Whitney v. State of NM, 113 
F.3d 1170,1173 (10th Cir. 1997). However, pro se litigants must still comply with 
minimal standards, jd. If errors alleged in the pro se brief, even if properly 
presented, would not amount to reversible error, they do not require full analysis. 
See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993). 
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Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not 
be addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
'"A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited.'" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). 
Petitioner has not properly briefed the issues. His brief does not identify any 
specific error by the district court. It does not cite to the record; nor does it cite 
applicable authority. It also does not provide any meaningful legal analysis. See 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108 
(Utah App. 1995). 
Petitioner's brief also fails to make clear assertions, leaving the State, and this 
Court, the task of divining his position. MacKay, 973 P.2d at 948-49 (rejecting 
appellee's and cross-appellant's claim for failure to make clear assertions or to 
engage in even a "modicum of analysis" where appellee merely "quote[d] or 
paraphrasefd] the record at great length, leaving [the] court with the task of 
attempting to divine [appellee's] position"). 
Petitioner nowhere provides an analytical basis for his claim that denial of his 
petition for post-conviction relief should be overturned on appeal. See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9) (providing that argument section of appellant's brief must "contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also 
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State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires 
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989) (holding that brief "must contain some support for each contention"). 
In sum, this Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump 
the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 
1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas, 
961 P.2d at 305. Accordingly, petitioner's claims should be rejected. See Jaeger, 
973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to the lack of meaningful 
analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on 
appeal where petitioner's brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to support 
his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same); 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same). 
Failure to Marshal. Petitioner's claims also fail because his grounds for relief 
ignore the district court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings (R. 205-
10, 242-46, 551-59, 596-605) (Addenda E, F, G & H).5 The law is well-settled that 
although the Court of Appeals will "review the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, 
'"we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and 
5
 Petitioner has also failed to include a copy of the transcript of the 
evidentiary hearing held in the post-conviction case. It does not appear that the 
hearing was ever transcribed, since a transcript is not part of the court file. 
11 
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's 
refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'"" Matthews v. Galetka, 958 
P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear 
weight of the evidence'" or if the reviewing court "'reaches a definite and firm 
conviction'" that they are mistaken. State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 
1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987)). The burden is on 
the petitioner to marshal all of the evidence in support of the district court's findings 
and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not support the findings. State v. 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-61 (Utah 1994). If the petitioner makes no attempt to 
marshal the evidence supporting the court's ruling and to demonstrate its 
insufficiency, this Court "accept[s] the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling." 
State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). 
Petitioner fails to carry his burden. Indeed, petitioner does not even 
acknowledge his burden to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's 
ruling. Instead, he refers only to facts or events which he believes are favorable to 
his position and then broadly asserts that contrary to the district court's ruling, the 
record supports his claims. Because petitioner has failed to marshal the supporting 
evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should accept the district 
court's findings. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d at 558. 
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In sum, petitioner's claims are inadequately briefed and neither marshal the 
evidence supporting the district court's findings, nor demonstrate its inadequacy. 
Therefore, this Court should decline to consider petitioner's challenge to the district 
court's ruling denying his petition for post-conviction relief. See Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger, 973 
P.2d at 410 (failure to meaningfully analyze claims). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AND DISMISSED THE 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. 
Should this Court excuse the failures of petitioner's brief, review of the action 
below nevertheless establishes that the district court properly denied and dismissed 
the petition for post-conviction relief. 
A. The district court properly summarily dismissed several of 
petitioner's claims. 
The district court summarily dismissed several of petitioner's claims (R. 205-
210,242-246) (Addenda E & F). These claims were dismissed before the State was 
ordered to respond, thus the State has not previously addressed these issues (R. 
242-246). On appeal, petitioner does not clearly raise these issues. However, in his 
"PRAYER FOR RELIEF" (Br. Aplt 22), petitioner alleges that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict, and that he was inappropriately sentenced to consecutive terms. 
These issues were among the claims which were summarily dismissed by the district 
court. Therefore, the State will address these claims now. 
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Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that when a petition for 
post-conviction relief is filed, "(t]he assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if 
it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, 
or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been 
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face The order of dismissal need 
not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(1). 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, a person is not eligible for relief on 
any ground that "was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal" or that "could have 
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996). 
In its Memorandum Decision dated June 30,1999, the district court summarily 
dismissed petitioner's claims relating to discretion of the trial judge, imposition of 
consecutive sentences, and insufficiency of the evidence, because these issues 
were "fully adjudicated on appeal, or should have been raised on appeal" (R. 
207)(Addendum E). 
On direct appeal, this Court addressed the issues related to consecutive 
sentences and held that "the trial court did not err in imposing two consecutive 
sentences." (R. 317-19) (Addendum D).6 This Court also stated that it would not 
consider petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because he had 
6
 The copy of the Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision found in the 
record at 317-19 is missing page 2. Therefore, a complete copy of the 
Memorandum Decision has been included in Addendum D). 
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failed to marshal the evidence and to demonstrate why the evidence was insufficient, 
jd. Thus, the district court properly summarily dismissed these issues. 
In July 1999, petitioner filed an amended petition (R. 219-228). The amended 
petition included new and additional claims. The district court entered an order 
summarily dismissing petitioner's new claims, which related to the scheduling of the 
trial and petitioner's allegations that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence on 
direct appeal. The basis for this dismissal was the new claims could have been 
raised on direct appeal, or the claims were frivolous (R. 242-246) (Addendum F). 
Thus, under the statutory guidelines of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the 
district court properly summarily dismissed these claims. 
In addition, petitioner has not alleged on appeal that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing these claims. Petitioner has not raised or addressed these 
issues anywhere in his appellate brief. Therefore, the issue of whether the district 
court properly summarily dismissed these claims is waived because it was not raised 
on appeal. See Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, U 21,988 P.2d 1 (issues not 
briefed by appellant are deemed waived and abandoned); Pixton v. State Farm 
Mutal Auto. Insur. Co. of Bloomington, ///., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991) 
(where appellant fails to brief an issue, the point is waived). 
B. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner had not 
established ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged that he received 
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ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a petitioner must meet the two-part test established in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He must show that (1) his attorney's performance 
was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, |d. at 687. 
Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
interview Detective Orton or call him as a witness at trial, and failed to introduce 
photographs of the scene of the crime (R. 553, 556-57)7 
Petitioner also alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to take steps 
to locate the unidentified couple who were briefly in the Deseret Industries store, 
shortly before petitioner committed the theft (R. 556). The State filed a written 
response to these claims, as requested by the Court (R. 513). 
After receiving the State's written response, the court entered a Memorandum 
Opinion which held that "even if the facts are as represented by the petitioner, he 
has failed to show any basis upon which the court could find his counsel ineffective 
for failing to pursue the unidentified couple. That claim is hereby dismissed 
summarily." (R. 555) (Addendum G).8 
7
 The district court also noted that at the evidentiary hearing petitioner 
attempted to present testimony about other alleged deficiencies in counsel's trial 
performance. "However, since those deficiencies were not raised by the 
petitioner in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court declined 
to hear that evidence." (R. 602). 
8
 This claim was not dismissed until after the state had filed its written 
response. However, it was dismissed prior to the evidentiary hearing. 
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The district court properly dismissed this claim. There was no indication who 
these people were, or whether they even lived in the local area. There was also no 
indication as to what their testimony would consist of, or even whether their 
testimony would help or hurt petitioner's case. It was not ineffective assistance of 
counsel to make a decision not to spend additional time and money on an attempt 
to locate an unnamed and unknown couple who may not even live in the area and 
whose testimony may not have helped the petitioner's case. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the Court also dismissed petitioner's other claims 
concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court ruled that the petitioner 
failed to satisfy the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (R. 599-601). 
The district court held that it was clear from the testimony of Detective Orton 
at the evidentiary hearing, that his testimony would not have been helpful to the 
petitioner at trial (R. 601) (Addendum H, p. 5). The Court held that petitioner failed 
to demonstrate how defense counsel erred by failing to call Detective Orton as a 
witness. In addition, even if there were any deficiency in not calling him as a 
witness, petitioner failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by failing 
to call Detective Orton as a witness (R. 599-601) (Addendum H, pp. 5-7). 
The district court also held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel 
erred in not taking photographs of the scene, and in relying on the diagram drawn 
by a witness at trial. Even if there were any error for failing to take and use 
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photographs, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice to his case from the 
lack of photographs (R. 598-99) (Addendum H, p. 7-8). 
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner had failed to establish that he 
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
On appeal, petitioner does not discuss the court's findings or challenge the 
court's ruling on these issues. Petitioner has failed to show that the court's findings 
were clearly erroneous, or that its conclusion that petitioner failed to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel was incorrect. See Grosser) v. Dewitt, 1999 UT 
App 167, If 10, 982 P.2d 581 ("because appellants do not challenge the court's 
findings, let alone demonstrate they are clearly erroneous, we 'assume [] that the 
record supports the findings of the district court.'") (quoting Interwest Constr. v. 
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,1358 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted)). 
C. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner failed 
to establish ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on direct appeal. Petitioner also alleged that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a reply brief, and for acknowledging on appeal that there 
was no dispute that petitioner intended to commit theft. 
After receiving the State's written response, the district court entered a 
memorandum decision which dismissed petitioner's allegation that he received 
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ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel failed to file a reply 
brief and told the Court of Appeals there was no dispute that the petitioner intended 
to commit a theft (R. 553-54) (Addendum G).9 
The district court properly dismissed these claims. In his appellate brief on 
direct appeal, counsel said: "Although Defendant does not dispute the theft of the 
cash and checks, there was a dispute as to whether he committed a burglary." (R. 
494). Petitioner Glasper testified at trial. Upon direct examination, he admitted to 
facts amounting to theft. He admitted that he picked up the bank bag, and that he 
unzipped it and saw money inside. He also admitted that he then put the bank bag 
in his pants and left the store. (R. 365 -68). Appellate counsel cannot change the 
facts from trial. Based on these facts, testified to by petitioner, appellate counsel 
appropriately conceded that petitioner did not dispute the theft. 
Similarly, appellate counsel was not ineffective for not filing a reply brief. After 
receiving an opposing party's brief, appellate counsel may be allowed - but is not 
required - to file a reply brief. Rule 24(c) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states: 
"The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee . . . Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." 
(emphasis added). Thus, a reply brief is not mandatory. In fact, the reply brief is 
9
 This claim was dismissed after the State's written response, but before 
the evidentiary hearing. 
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limited to answering new matters set forth in the opposing brief. If no new matters 
were set forth in the opposing brief, then no reply brief is necessary. 
Here, counsel for petitioner did not simply neglect to file a reply brief. Rather, 
he made a specific choice and advised the Court that he did not intend to file a reply 
brief (R. 258). Petitioner did not raise any allegations as to why a reply brief should 
have been filed or what issues he believed a reply brief could have addressed. He 
did not allege that opposing counsel's brief raised any new matters which should 
have been addressed in a reply brief. Accordingly, petitioner has not established 
that failure to file a reply brief was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
After the evidentiary hearing, (which established that there was no ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel), the district court found that petitioner had presented no 
evidence supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (R. 598) 
(Addendum H). The court held that there was no evidence that the appeal was 
mishandled or that counsel's work on the appeal was prejudicial to petitioner, id. 
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner failed to establish ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court's ruling dismissing the petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ d a v of August, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
x& y a / ^ y A jx. o s 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
1 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The 
petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue 
on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of 
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in 
relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of 
the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause 
shown. The petition shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of 
proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those 
proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to 
relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of 
probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate 
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those 
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons 
why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the 
trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the 
petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct 
appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil 
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proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to 
the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, 
the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
(g) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the petition, and, if it 
is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim 
in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the 
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. 
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with 
the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the 
pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing 
of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave 
to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good 
cause shown. 
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a 
case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the 
petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition 
that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and 
memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or 
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In ail other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for 
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the 
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portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service 
by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may 
respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted 
unless ordered by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a 
hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but 
the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the 
petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at 
the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing 
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be 
conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before 
the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is 
confined. 
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court 
upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is 
necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony 
conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give 
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a 
new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by 
these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the 
stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order 
to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial 
court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, 
discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper. 
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(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to 
any party as it deems appropnate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be 
paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody 
of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4 7 govern 
the manner and procedure by which the tnal court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge 
for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes 
governing appeals to those courts. 
History: Added effective July 1,1996. 
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Addendum B 
78-35a-101 JUDICIAL CODE 646 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-35a-101. Short title. 
This act shall be known as the "Post-Convictjon Remedies 
Act" lies 
78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for 
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal rem-
edies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsec-
tion (2) Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of 
a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 
(2) This chapter does not apply to-
la) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense, 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
less 
78-35a-103. Applicability — Effect on petitions. 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 
78-35a-107, this chapter applies only to post-conviction pro-
ceedings filed on or after July 1,1996. lsee 
78-36*104. Grouiidsforrelief—Retroactivity of rule, 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-36a-106 or 78-36a-107, a 
person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal 
offense may file an action m the district court of original 
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or 
Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute* that is 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was 
prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed m an unlawful manner, 
or probation was revoked m an unlawful manner, 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution, or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that re-
quires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, 
because: 
d) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel 
knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing 
or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, 
and the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
(u) the material evidence is not merely cumulative 
of evidence that was known; 
(in) the material evidence is not merely impeach-
ment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly 
discovered material evidence demonstrates that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the peti-
tioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence 
received 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the 
benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme 
Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after 
the petitioner s conviction became final shall be governed by 
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity lies 
78-36V106. Burden of proof. 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a 
preponderance of die evidence the facts necessary to entitle 
the petitioner to relief The respondent has the burden of 
pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, 
but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden 
to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence 
199* 
7S-35a-lO& Preclusion of relief — Exception. 
( D A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon 
any ground that 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial 
motion, 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, 
(c) could have been but was not raised at tnal or on 
appeal, 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for 
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not 
raised in s previous request for post-conviction relief or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established m 
Section 78-35a-107 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (lXc), a person may be 
eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been 
but was not raised at tnal or on appeal, if the failure to raise 
that ground was due to ineffective aaaiatance of counsel lsee 
7*46e>107. Statute of limitations for poet-conviction 
relief. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is 
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues 
on the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the 
final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken, 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court 
which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken, 
(c) the last day for filing s petition for writ of certiorari 
in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed, 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of 
certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for 
certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed, 
or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have 
known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of eviden-
tiary facts on which the petition is based 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a 
court may excuse s petitioner's failure to file within the time 
limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limi-
tations period established in this section. lsee 
78-36e>10*. Effect of granting relief — Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it 
shall either 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order 
a new trial or sentencing proceeding as appropriate 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence the 
order shall be stayed for five days Within the stay period, 
the respondent shall give written notice to the court and 
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial 
or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives 
notice at any time during the stay penod that it intends to 
take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the 
order to the custodian of the petitioner 
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(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry 
or resentence the petitioner, the trial court may order any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentenc-
ing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary. ise* 
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dis-
missed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent 
petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. Counsel who 
represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may 
not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court 
shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations 
that will require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of 
law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for 
proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section 
was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent 
post-conviction petition. itss 
78-36a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment 
on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court 
having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3. 
IMS 
Addendum C 
1 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202. 
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76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953,76-6-404, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 
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Addendum D 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
SEP 1 1 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Roy Lee Glasper, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 971439-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 11, 1998) 
Fifth District, Cedar City Department 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Attorneys: Floyd W. Holm, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Whether the trial court correctly imposed two sentences is a 
question of law that we review for correctness. See State v. 
Stettina, 868 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)• Appellant may 
be punished for both burglary and theft unless both were 
established by "the same act . . . under a single criminal 
episode." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1995). The trial court 
concluded--and the State does not now dispute—that appellant's 
burglary and theft were part of a single criminal episode. 
Accordingly, the trial court may only punish appellant for crimes 
that "were a result of separate and distinct acts that resulted 
in separate and distinct crimes." State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 
896, 900 (Utah 1986) (holding trial court did not err in imposing 
sentences for four separate crimes). 
Appellant misstates the law in arguing that although neither 
burglary nor theft is a lesser included offense of the other, in 
this case he could not have committed one without the other and, 
therefore, he should not be punished for both. In fact, 
appellant completed the burglary when he unlawfully entered for 
the purpose of committing a theft--regardless of whether he 
completed the theft. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1995). 
Likewise, appellant committed the theft by exercising control 
over another's property with the intent to deprive--regardless of 
whether the property was in a location open to the public. See 
id. § 76-6-404 (1995). Therefore, notwithstanding the single 
criminal episode, ff[t]hese are separate acts requiring proof of 
different elements and constitute separate offenses." State v. 
Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). See Duran v. 
Cook. 788 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (concluding theft 
is not lesser included offense of burglary). See also State v. 
Porter. 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) ("Although defendant's 
crimes were committed during a single criminal episode, he 
committed two distinct burglaries separately punishable under 
section 76-1-402."). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
imposing two consecutive sentences. 
We will not consider appellant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the burglary conviction. 
To challenge the verdict in a criminal bench trial on the grounds 
of insufficient evidence, appellant must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and 
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom," even viewed in the light most 
favorable to the court below, "is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack." State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 
475-76 (Utah 1990). When a defendant merely "reargue[s] [his] 
case by recounting a version of the facts most favorable to [the] 
defendant while ignoring" evidence supporting the conviction, he 
has neither marshaled the evidence nor demonstrated why it is 
insufficient. State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . 
Appellant asserts that the record contained conflicting 
evidence and points to those facts supporting a finding that the 
theft occurred without an unlawful entry. In so doing, appellant 
neither marshals the evidence favorable to the trial court's 
finding nor does he demonstrate how that evidence is somehow 
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insufficient to support the pertinent findings and resulting 
conviction.1 
Affirmed. 
^(TX-
Gregory JSr Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Noionan H. Jacksqj^T Judge 
1. In one limited respect, appellant's challenge presents a 
question of law not dependent on his first marshaling the 
evidence. Appellant argues that entry into the manager's office 
was not unlawful if the store was open to the public. In 
support, he points to an Alaska case which held that the 
defendant did not commit burglary by entering a beer cooler 
designated "employees only" because it was in 
and liquor store. See Arabie v. State, 699 P. 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985). Arabie is inapposite, 
unlike the Utah Code, the Alaska statute does 
unlawful entry into a portion of a building. 
Alaska Stat. § 11.46.310(a) (Michie 1996). 
a public grocery 
,2d 890, 892, 895 
however, because, 
not contemplate 
See id. at 892; 
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Addendum E 
FILED 
JUN 3 " 1999 
5th DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY 
DEPUTY CLERK ™ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROY LEE GLASPER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A.C. NEWLAND, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 990500385 
This matter comes before the court pursuant to Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The case began on June 21, 1999, with the filing of Petitioner's Application For 
Writ Of Habeas Corpus, Affidavit of Impecuniosity, and Motion For Appointment Of Counsel. 
The court has reviewed the filings and now enters the following findings, conclusions and 
decisions. 
Applicable Rule of Procedure 
Petitioner brings his Application For Writ Of Habeas Corpus under the provisions of 
Rule 65B of the Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). Since the Petitioner's Application 
challenges his conviction and sentence for a criminal offense, it is actually an Application 
which should be brought under the provisions of Rule 65C URCP and Utah's Post Conviction 
Remedies Act, 78-35a-101, et seg^ This court will consider this Application pursuant to that 
Rule and those statutory provisions. 
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
The Petitioner has requested that the State of Utah, or one of its political subdivisions, 
provide him with legal counsel to pursue this Application on his behalf. Under the law of this 
State, the Petitioner is not entitled to such legal counsel for the prosecution of a proceeding 
such as is currently before the court. This court has no resources available to provide legal 
assistance to the Petitioner and therefore denies his Motion. No legal counsel will be 
provided. 
Impecuniositv Affidavit 
It is apparent from the Petitioner's Affidavit and circumstances that he is unable to pay 
the costs of this proceeding, and the court so finds. Petitioner is allowed to proceed without 
paying the usual filing fees. 
Jurisdictional Issues 
In reviewing the Application, the court notes that the Petitioner is confined in the 
California Prison System. Petitioner does not state why he is entitled to relief from a Utah 
court. However, since the court has no facts, the court will assume that jurisdiction exists for 
the present. Likewise, the Petition does not specify whether the named Respondent, A.C. 
Newland, is the California custodian of the Petitioner or someone in Utah who holds the 
Petitioner in custody. 
Summary Dismissal of Some Claims 
Rule 65C (g)(1) URCP provides as follows: 
"Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, 
and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior 
proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been 
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to 
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of 
law." 
Rule 65C (g) (2) URCP provides as follows: 
"A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in 
the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior 
to the filing of the petition." 
Section 78-35a-106 Utah Code Annotated (UCA) provides as follows: 
"(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107." 
A review of the Application filed by the Petitioner quickly reveals that Petitioner is 
attempting to re-litigate claims already ruled upon during the direct appeal in this case. In a 
Memorandum Decision issued September 11, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court. In that same Decision, the Court of Appeals 
refused to consider the claims of the appellant relating to the sufficiency of the evidence 
because the appellant had failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision. 
In the footnote the same court held that the entry into the manager's office could constitute a 
burglary because of the wording of Utah's burglary statute. 
In his Application, Petitioner challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences by the 
trial court, claims that the trial judge abused his discretion is imposing that sentence and claims 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from trial and appellate counsel, However, in 
his Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Petition For Writ Of Habeas 
Corpus filed contemporaneously with the Application, the Petitioner argues the sufficiency of 
the evidence at trial and the ineffective counsel issues. 
It is apparent that the issues raised by Petitioner have been fully adjudicated on appeal, 
or should have been raised on appeal, with the possible exception of the claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Pursuant to the Rules and statute cited above, the Petitioner is not 
entitled to raise those adjudicated issues by this Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Accordingly, the court now summarily dismisses the Petitioner's claims related to the 
imposition of consecutive sentences, the abuse of discretion of the trial judge for imposing 
consecutive sentences, and the insufficiency of the evidence. 
At this point the court is unable to determine if the Petitioner's claims of ineffective 
assistance have, or should have, been raised on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to URCP, Rule 
65C (h), the clerk is hereby directed to serve a copy of this Order, the Application and all 
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attachments, as well as Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities on the Attorney 
General for the State of Utah. The clerk is also to mail a copy of this order to the Petitioner. 
DATED this 30th day of June 1999. 
Jy^fHLIP EVES, ^strict Court Judge 
ooe 0G 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of June 1999,1 mailed true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Roy Lee Glasper, K90014 
P.O. Box 4000, Bid 4-222 
Vacaville, CA 95696-4000 
Jan C. Graham, Esq. 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
/yyK. /y&»— 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROY LEE GLASPER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
A.C. NEWLAND, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
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OEPUTY CLEr'K , 
This matter came before the court this date for review of the file. The court determinea 
that since its Memorandum Decision of June 30, 1999, the parties have been filing documents 
which have not been brought to the court's attention by courtesy copies or by Notice to Submit 
For Decision. Having now reviewed those filings, the court now enters the following 
Findings, Conclusions and Order. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the court directed that the Petitioner's Application For 
Writ Of Habeas Corpus was to be served upon the Attorney General of the State of Utah for a 
response, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On July 19, 1999, Erin Riley, Assistant Attorney General for Utah filed the State's 
Motion To Dismiss asking that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice. The Motion was 
based on the form of the Petition which appeared to name as respondent an official of the 
California Penal System, where Mr. Glasper is serving his Utah sentences. The Utah Attorney 
General took the position in the Motion to Dismiss that it had no authority to represent the 
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California prison official holding Mr Glasper and asked that the Petition by dismissed so Mr 
Glasper could file an amended Petitioner naming a Utah respondent. 
Instead of filing a response to the Motion To Dismiss, Mr. Glasper sent a handwritten 
letter to the court in which he referenced the Motion by Erin Riley. That letter was filed with 
the court on July 19, 1999. The letter did not oppose the Motion but indicated that the 
Petitioner intended to amend his petition. 
On July 26, 1999, the Petitioner filed with the court an Amended Petition For Writ Of 
Habeas Corpus. This filing was not brought to the attention of this, or any other judge of this 
court. The Amended Petition seems to raise new issues as well as some of the issues 
previously dismissed from the original Petition filed by Mr. Glasper. 
On August 11, 1999, Mr. Glasper caused to be filed a Request For Extension Of Time 
In Which To File A Notice Of Appeal. 
On August 9, 1999, the Attorney General for Utah filed a Motion For Clarification 
asking if the court had ruled on the Motion to Dismiss and asking for clarification of the need 
to respond to the Amended Petition now on file. 
Having now learned of the various filings by the parties since the court's Memorandum 
Decision, the court now enters the following: 
1. Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss; 
2. Ruling on the Request For Extension Of Time In Which To File A Notice Of 
Appeal; and 
3. Ruling on the Motion For Clarification. 
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Motion To Dismiss 
The time for a response to this motion has now expired with no opposition having been 
filed by Mr. Glasper. Indeed, Mr. Glasper has filed an Amended Petition, which the court 
takes as an indication that he does not oppose the Motion To Dismiss as long as he is able to 
file the Amended Petition. Therefore, the court now grants the Motion to Dismiss and the 
original Petition is hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an amended petition 
naming the State Of Utah as respondent. 
Request For Extension Of Time In Which To File A Notice Of Appeal 
The time for response to this Request has also expired with no opposition from the State 
of Utah. However, since there is no final, appealable order in this case from which Mr. 
Glasper can appeal, the Request is hereby denied, as it is premature. 
Motwm for Clarification 
Having now ruled on the Motion To Dismiss, the court has already dealt with some of 
the issues raised in the State's Motion. The State's Motion To Dismiss has been granted. 
The court hereby rules that the Amended Petition filed by Mr. Glasper shall be treated 
as timely filed and presently before the court. 
In compliance with Rule 65C, the court has now reviewed the Amended Petition to 
determine whether any or all of the issues raised therein are subject to summary dismissal for 
being frivolous, or for having been previously adjudicated. In its Memorandum Decision of 
June 30, 1999, the court held that the claims of the petitioner raised in the original petition 
were subject to summary dismissal, except the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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These claims were dismissed because they were raised and ruled upon, or should have been 
raised during the direct appeal. 
In his Amended Petition, Mr. Giasper again argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction, and claims abuse of discretion by the trial judge in finding him guilty. 
These issues have been adjudicated on direct appeal, or should have been raised on direct 
appeal and therefore they are again order summarily dismissed by this court. Likewise, Mr. 
Giasper should have raised his claims relating to the scheduling of the trial and his allegations 
that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence on direct appeal. Those claims are likewise 
dismissed as frivolous. These rulings dispose of the portions of the Amended Petition 
designated as Arguments 1,2, and 5. 
At this point, without any factual setting, the court is unable to determine whether the 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel are frivolous. The State Of Utah 
is directed to respond to those points designated as Arguments 3, 4, 6, and 7 within the time 
limits set out in Rule 65C. The clerk will mail a copy of this Order to the Attorney General 
for the State of Utah, care of Assistant Erin Riley and to the Petitioner. 
DATED this Q ~~day of September 1999. 
J. P#fLIP EVES, Di&ict Court Judge 
0024 j 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this % day of September 1999, I mailed true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Roy Lee Glasper 
#K-90014 / Bid. 23-C-3U 
CSP-Solano 
P.O. Box 4000 
Vacaville, CA 95695-4000 
Erin Riley, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
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Addendum G 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROY LEE GLASPER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CASE NO. 990500385 WR 
-IAN i ,::: 
otn DlSTFiCT COURT 
mON QOUN'I i 
OEPUTY CLERK ^ ^ 
This matter comes before the court for decision on the pending Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief (Petition) and "Motion to compel Deputy Attorney General Erin Riley to 
prepare and forward copies of case Law." (hereinafter Motion To Compel), both filed by 
Petitioner Roy Lee Glasper. The court has reviewed the record and the submissions of the 
parties and now finds and rules as follows. 
Motion To Compel 
Petitioner was sentenced in Utah to two consecutive terms of 0 to 5 years in the State 
prison upon his conviction for theft and burglary. He is currently incarcerated in a California 
Prison, having been transferred there at this own request. He is still under the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Board of Pardons. 
Mr. Glasper filed his petition in this state and this court, raising various claims of 
impropriety relating to his conviction and sentence. The court ordered his claims dismissed as 
frivolous, except those raising claims relating to his assertion that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. (See the court's Memorandum Decision of September 8, 1999.) 
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The Utah Attorney General filed a Response to the remaining claims on November 12, 
1999. Thereafter, on November 15, 1999, Mr. Glasper filed his Motion To Compel, in which 
he seeks an order of this court requiring the Utah Attorney General to "...prepare true and 
clear, complete copies of all case law, Statutes, and referred to material that cannot be found in 
the prison law library here at Solano State Prison in California." 
Assistant Attorney General Erin Riley, who represents the State of Utah in this matter, 
has filed an objection to Petitioner's Motion To Compel. The State argues that it lacks the 
resources to comply with Mr. Glasper's unusual request. The State further argues that there is 
no legal requirement that Mr. Glasper be provided legal research by the State's counsel in a 
proceeding brought be Mr. Glasper under the provisions of Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
There has been no response to the State's objection by Mr. Glasper, even though the 
objection was filed on December 13, 1999. 
The court is not aware of any statute or case law requiring counsel for the respondent in 
a post-conviction relief case to provide the pro se petitioner with copies of the legal research 
upon which the respondent relies. This court sees no reason to order that procedure in this 
case. The petitioner's Motion To Compel is overruled and denied. 
To grant the motion would place the State's attorney in the position of supplying the 
petitioner with his legal research. The burden of supplying the petitioner with legal authorities 
rests upon the petitioner, even though he is representing himself. It is enough that the State's 
representative provides the citation to the cases and statutes upon which it relies. These 
materials are published, and it is up to the respondent to go to the effort of obtaining any 
copies which he chooses to review. 
In addition, there is no affidavit or other proof before the court that the Solano State 
Prison library does not contain these materials, except the unsworn statement of the petitioner. 
The problem may well be that the petitioner lacks the legal research skills to locate those cases, 
and it is clear to this court that Mr. Glasper is not entitled to enlist the legal expertise of the 
opposing counsel to do that research or provide it to petitioner. 
The issues remaining to be resolved in this case relate to the petitioner's claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The petitioner has adequately addressed 
the issues raised by the leading case in the area, Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), and has cited that case in his pleadings. The determination to be made is not legally 
complicated. 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
The Petition currently before the court is the Amended Petition For Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, Post Conviction Remedies, (hereinafter Petition) filed by the petitioner on July 26, 
1999. The State of Utah has now responded to the arguments numbered 3, 4, 6, and 7 in the 
Petition, as ordered by this court. Likewise, the petitioner has filed his reply to the State's 
response. Having reviewed the file, and the submissions of the parties, the court now rules as 
follows. 
Argument #3 
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel, Floyd W. Holm, was ineffective because he 
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failed to call "Detective Orton" as a witness at the trial or to get in touch with him. The State 
properly points out that the petitioner did not include in his petition any reference to what 
Detective Orton might have said at trial to assist him in his defense. 
In his reply, however, petitioner alleges that he was shown Detective Orton's police 
report and that it contained quotes from witnesses that would have buttressed petitioner's claim 
that the money bag in this case was taken from the counter in the main part of the store, and 
not from the manager's office. Petitioner points out that if Detective Orton was told by the 
witnesses that he took the money from the sales counter, rather than from the manager's office, 
the outcome on the burglary charge may have been different. 
The court finds that an evidentiary hearing should be scheduled to allow the parties to 
question witnesses on this issue. The court would be aided by an opportunity to review 
Detective Orton's report, and to hear testimony from defense counsel about the decision not to 
call Detective Orton to impeach the prosecution's witnesses, assuming the statements made by 
the witnesses differ from their testimony at the trial. 
Argument #4 
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel, Floyd W. Holm, was ineffective because he did 
not take reasonable steps to locate an unidentified couple who were briefly in the Deseret 
Industries store while the petitioner and his niece were there shortly before the theft of the 
money. Petitioner argues that Mr. Holm should have obtained investigation funds from the 
court to place an add in an attempt to identify these unnamed witnesses. In his reply the 
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petitioner admits that the attempt to locate these witnesses would have been a long shot and 
that he has no idea what they may have seen or what they might say at the trial. 
The State response is that the petitioner has wholly failed to show that counsel's 
decision not to place an add was prejudicial him. The identity of the couple was never 
obtained. They left the scene while the police and the Deseret Industries employees were busy 
trying to apprehend the petitioner and his niece. There is no description of them or their 
vehicle. No one connected with this case has any information about where they might live. 
No one knows if their testimony would have hurt or helped the petitioner. 
The court agrees with the State. To prevail on these claims, the petitioner must meet 
the burden of demonstrating that the conduct of counsel was ineffective under the two prong 
test articulated in the Strickland v. Washington case cited above. Certainly counsel was within 
his discretion to decline to pursue unknown and unidentified witnesses, especially when there 
was no way of knowing what they might say. Such an approach might well have developed 
damaging evidence which the prosecution and police had not unearthed. 
Therefore, court now finds that even if the facts are as represented by the petitioner, he 
has failed to show any basis upon which the court could find his counsel ineffective for failing 
to pursue the unidentified couple. That claim is hereby dismissed summarily. 
In this portion of his amended petition, petitioner also makes reference to certain 
photographs which he claims were taken at the store by Mr. Holm. Petitioner asserts that Mr. 
Holm told him that the photographs had evidentiary value, but never introduced the photos as 
evidence at the trial. 
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The court is of the opinion, and now rules, that the petitioner is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the photographs so that the photographs may be presented 
to the court and Mr. Holm questioned about his decision not to introduce them at the trial. 
Argument #6 
Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel, Mr. Floyd Holm, gave him ineffective 
assistance when he told the Court of Appeals that there was no dispute that the petitioner 
intended to commit a theft when he picked up the money bag, secreted it in his clothing and 
left the store. 
The State responds that the position taken before the Court of Appeals was the same 
position taken at the trial, and was consistent with the petitioner's own testimony at the time of 
the trial. 
The Court now rules, summarily, that the petitioner has failed to raise any justiciable 
issue in this argument and that he has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel as 
a matter of law. His claims under this portion of his Petition are hereby dismissed. 
Argument #7 
Petitioner again asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective by admitted to the 
Court of Appeals that the petitioner entered the store to commit a theft and by not filing a reply 
brief before that court. 
In its response, the State quotes the portion of Mr. Holm's brief which gave rise to 
petitioner's complaint. Mr. Holm actually told the Court of Appeals "Although Defendant 
does not dispute the theft of the cash and checks, there was a dispute as to whether he 
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committed a burglary." (Quoting Appellants Brief, p. 4.) The State points out that Mr. 
Holm's statement is entirely consistent with the position of the petitioner before the trial court 
and the petitioner's own testimony there. 
The court finds that the claim of the petitioner regarding the above quoted statement in 
the brief filed with the Court of Appeals does not, as a matter of law, demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel. That argument of the petitioner is summarily dismissed. 
The issue raise on appeal was not whether the petitioner committed a theft. The 
evidence before the trial court on that point was overwhelming. The appeal was filed to see if 
the evidence was sufficient to support the burglary conviction and the resulting consecutive 
sentences. Mr. Holm did not concede that issue before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, his 
statement was an attempt to frame the issue being raised on appeal. It would have been folly 
for Mr. Holm to attempt to argue that the evidence before the trial court did not support the 
conviction for theft, especially since his own client had admitted the theft at the trial. 
QRPER FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARJNQ 
The case is ordered set for an evidentiary hearing on the remaining issues. The hearing 
shall be limited to evidence on: 
1. Mr. Holm's decision not to interview Detective Orton or call him as a witness at the 
trial; and 
2. Mr. Holm's decision not to introduce photographs of the Deseret Industries store at 
trial. 
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The matter is set for a scheduling conference in which both the petitioner and the 
attorney representing the State of Utah are to participate by telephone. The clerk will calendar 
the hearing and send notice to the parties of the time and date. During that conference the 
court will address the witnesses to be called, the exhibits to be introduced and the timing of the 
hearing. In addition, the court will discuss transportation concerns so that the petitioner can be 
present at the hearing. 
Since the petitioner is incarcerated, the court hereby orders that the Office of the Utah 
Attorney General is to set up the telephonic scheduling conference and to arrange for Mr. 
Glasper's participation, and then connect the court at the appointed hour. Any arrangements 
concerning the scheduling conference can be coordinated with the court by calling Maxine at 
(435)477-8695. 
DATED this 20th day of January 2000. 
J. PHILIP EVES, D^trict Court Judge 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of January 2000,1 mailed true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Roy Lee Glasper, K90014 
CSP Solano 
P.O. Box 4000-23-B-2U 
Vacaville, CA 95695-4000 
Erin Riley, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
/yyu^^ sn l / V W ^ w ^ . 
Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk 
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Addendum H 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROY LEE GLASPER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CASE NO. 990500385 WR 
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This matter came before the court for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Glaspef^ili> pltsciiu • 
representing himself. The State of Utah was represented by Erin Riley of the Utah Attorney 
General's Office. The court heard argument and evidence. The court now enters the 
following findings, conclusions and ruling. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In January, 1997, the petitioner and his cousin were arrested in Cedar City, Utah and 
charged with criminal acts. The petitioner was originally charged with burglary, theft and 
receiving stolen property. The case was investigated by the Cedar City Police Department and 
written statements were taken from the witnesses. The follow up investigation by the police 
department was under the direction of Detective Kelvin Orton. 
The Iron County Attorney's Office was given the reports and information compiled by 
the police and filed formal charges against the petitioner. A preliminary hearing was held and 
the petitioner was bound over to the district court on all three charges pending against him. 
The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was set for trial by a jury. 
On the day of the jury trial, the petitioner elected to waive his right to a jury. The case 
was tried to the court after the State moved to dismiss the receiving stolen property charge. At 
the start of the trial, the petitioner admitted that he committed the crime of theft, as alleged in 
the Information, except that he reserved the issue of the amount of money taken. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that the petitioner had committed 
theft by taking a money bag containing currency from the desk in the office at the rear of the 
Deseret Industries Store and fixed the amount of money taken in the Third Degree Felony 
range. The court also found that the petitioner had committed burglary by entering the 
enclosed office for the purpose of committing the theft. The petitioner was committed to the 
state prison. 
Throughout the preliminary hearing and trial proceedings, the petitioner was 
represented by Mr. Floyd W. Holm as counsel for the indigent. Mr. Holm was, at the time, 
an experienced trial attorney, having tried about 20 jury trials and over a hundred day long 
court trials. Following the sentencing in this matter, the petitioner hired private counsel for a 
brief period and filed notice of appeal. He then requested appointed counsel and Mr. Holm 
was reappointed to represent him during the appeal, and did so. 
On September 11, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision 
affirming the petitioner's conviction of both charges and upholding the sentence imposed. 
On June 21, 1999, the petitioner filed in this court his Application For Writ Of Habeas 
Corpus. At the time he was housed in the California State Prison System having been 
transferred there by the Board of Pardons. 
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On June 30, 1999, this court issued a Memorandum Decision pursuant to Rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in which some of the issues raised by petitioner were summarily 
dismissed for the reasons stated in that Memorandum Decision. The remaining issue on the 
Application which survived summary dismissal was the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel which the petitioner raised for the first time since the trial, so far as the court was able 
to determine. Accordingly the Attorney General was served with the Application and 
responded with a Motion To Dismiss on the grounds that the respondent named in the 
Application was actually an official of the California Penal System and that the respondent 
should be the detaining authorities in the State of Utah. 
In response, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
naming the State of Utah as respondent. The Attorney General's Office then filed a Motion 
For Clarification. 
On September 8, 1999, the court issued its Order ruling on the pending Motions. The 
matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial and appellate counsel. 
Thereafter, in response to motions from the petitioner, the court issued yet another 
Memorandum Opinion on January 21, 2000, in which the court delineated the two claims 
raised by the petitioner upon which the court would received evidence at the hearing: 
1. Mr. Holm's decision not to interview Detective Orton or call him as a witness at the 
trial, and 
2. Mr. Holm's decision not to introduce photographs of the Deseret Industries store at 
the trial. 
3 
It was that evidentiary hearing that occurred on May 9, 2000. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
At the hearing the petitioner attempted to present testimony from witnesses about other 
alleged deficiencies in Mr. Holm's trial performance. However, since those deficiencies were 
not raised by the petitioner in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court 
declined to hear that evidence. 
The court finds that Mr. Holm did not interview Detective Orton in preparation for the 
trial, although he may have questioned him at the time of the preliminary hearing. The court 
finds further that Mr. Holm did not interview the witnesses from the crime scene, except to 
question them during their testimony at the preliminary hearing. The court finds further that 
Mr. Holm did not call Detective Orton as a witness for the defense at the trial. 
Regarding the introduction of photographs at the trial, the court finds that no one on 
either side of the case took any photographs of the interior of the Deseret Industries Store to 
show the layout of the store for trial. The Deseret Industries Store is a commercial 
establishment open to the public and familiar to Mr. Holm. Mr. Holm determined that a 
diagram drawn by the store manager would suffice to illustrate to the court the issues presented 
in the case. Such a diagram was made during the trial at Mr. Holm's request, marked as an 
exhibit and introduced in evidence. The court had reference to the diagram at all times during 
the testimony of the employees from Deseret Industries and the petitioner. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL 
The petitioner has the burden of proving his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
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pursuant to the two prong test enunciated in the U.S. Supreme Court case entitled Strickland v 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
"{10} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
the assistance of counsel to defendants in all criminal prosecutions. This right has 
been interpreted as "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970). 
The test for determining when a defendant has been denied this right is set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
Strickland establishes a two-part test: First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 
The petitioner must first show that the performance of his attorney was deficient when 
compared to the expected performance for trial counsel and that the deficiencies were 
prejudicial to the petitioner's case." fState v. Finlavson. 386 UAR 57 (Utah 2000)] 
Detective Orton 
The petitioner argues that his counsel should have called Detective Orton as a witness at 
the trial. Although it might have been more appropriate for Mr. Holm to have interviewed 
Detective Orton prior to the trial, it is clear from the testimony of Detective Orton which was 
received at the hearing on May 9, 2000, that Detective Orton's testimony would not have been 
helpful to the petitioner. Detective Orton's testimony demonstrates that he does not possess 
any evidence contrary to the statements of the witnesses about the location of the money bag 
before the petitioner admittedly took it. The detective does not have useful impeachment 
information to attack the credibility of the Deseret Industries employees. 
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Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his defense counsel erred by failing to call 
Detective Orton. Rather, the defense attorney, Mr. Holm, testified that he expected that 
Detective Orton's testimony, if presented at trial, would acaially have the effect of buttressing 
the statements of the State's witnesses to the detriment of the petitioner, as it would have 
shown that they were consistent in their statements about the location of the money bag. 
Mr. Holm also testified that he could not have called Detective Orton to testify as to 
hearsay statements of the witnesses, because the statements given to him were consistent with 
the statements the witnesses gave at the trial. 
Additionally, even if Mr. Holm erred in not calling Detective Orton as a witness, the 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by that error. The trial in 
this case came down to a simple question: Did Mr. Glasper take the money bag from the cash 
register counter in the public part of the store or did he take the money bag from the enclosed 
office in the back of the store where he had no right to go? 
Mr. Golds worthy's testimony was unequivocal that the money bag was left on the top 
of the desk in the back office of the store when he went out on the sales floor to tell Mr. 
Glasper's niece that the store was closed. That testimony was buttressed, at least in part, by 
the testimony of Ms. Stover, who testified that as she was coming up to the sales floor area 
from a downstairs portion of the store, she saw the petitioner moving stealthily through the 
clothes racks on the sales floor and coming from the direction of the office. She observed that 
he had the store's money bag in his hand and saw him conceal it in his pants. She went 
immediately to Mr. Golds worthy, who was standing near the cash register counter, and 
reported her observations. 
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These statements were apparently consistent with the testimony and statements ot these 
two witnesses from the very beginning of this case. 
On the other hand, Mr. Giasper testified that he did not enter the office at the rear of 
the store, but that he found the money bag lying on the cash register counter, picked it up and 
left the store with it. His version of the theft was in clear contradiction to the version given by 
the Deseret Industries employees. The court considered the possible motives of the witnesses 
to fabricate their testimony and chose to believe the employees, rather that Mr. Giasper. 
Petitioner has failed to show that Detective Orton had any helpful information to 
contribute at the trial which would have cast a different light on the assessment of the facts 
made by the court. 
Photographs 
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have taken pictures of the Deseret 
Industries Store and introduced them at trial, rather than to rely on a diagram of the store. The 
court finds that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his counsel erred in not taking such 
photos or in relying on the diagram drawn by the witness. 
Mr. Holm testified that he did not think that photographs were necessary In tact, 
during his testimony Mr. Holm opined that unless he could get a photograph that showed the 
Deseret Industries building from the air without its roof, the diagram was the only way to show 
the court the relative positions of the office, the cash register counter, the front door, the stair 
case from downstairs and the witnesses at any given time. 
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Even if there was some error attributable to Mr. Holm for failing to take and submit 
photos, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to his case from the lack of 
photographs. The issue at trial was whether the court would believe the statements of the 
Deseret Industries employees or the statements of Mr. Glasper, who had admitted being a 
thief. The court chose, in its discretion, to believe the employees. Photographs would not 
have helped to change that exercise of discretion by the court. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL 
The petitioner has presented no evidence supporting his claim that he was rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. He argues, without any evidentiary support, that at 
one time during his representation by Mr. Holm, he expressed dissatisfaction with the handling 
of the trial. However, Mr. Holm has no recollection of any such conversation. Since the 
petitioner did not testify at the May 9, 2000 hearing, there is no evidence supporting 
petitioner's assertions. 
Mr. Holm testified that he was never told that the petitioner was unhappy with his 
work, and consequently never told the court that Mr. Glasper was unhappy with his work, 
because he was not aware that Mr. Glasper felt that way. He stated that if he had known that 
Mr. Glasper was not happy with his work, he would have immediately sought permission to 
withdraw from the case and to have another attorney appointed to represent Mr. Glasper. 
The court finds that there is no evidence that the appeal in this matter was mishandled 
by Mr. Holm, or that his work on that appeal was prejudicial to petitioner. 
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Accordingly, the Petition of the petitioner is denied in its entirety, and this application 
is dismissed. 
DATED this 11th day of May 2000. 
0-
, QKstric 
J. PHILIP EVES, BKstrict Court Judge 
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